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Abstract: Indonesia is a rising center of  K-pop fandom next to 
China and Japan. This study examines K-pop fandom in 
Indonesia by focusing on intercultural communication between 
two countries whose cultural and religious differences are 
extensive. An ethnographic study of  young Muslims in 
Indonesia was conducted in order to examine the motivations 
and cultural practice of  K-pop fans. Having the largest Muslim 
population in the world, Indonesia has young people who both 
practice religious piety sincerely, and enjoy Korean popular 
music passionately. Although these interests appear to be 
contradictory, the historical and social context of  Indonesian 
Islam provides a clue about how they accept cultural diversity. 
K-pop fandom implies multiple meaning. Long term study of  
this ethnography using in-depth interviews and participatory 
observation is an attempt to find the inner meaning of  K-pop 
fandom in Indonesia seemingly contradicting from religious 
piety that most young Indonesians maintain now. Cultural 
tastes of  young Muslims imply social consciousness and vision 
of  new cultural identity that they wish to promote. This case 
may enlighten a new alternative to the radicalization of  Islam 
and an example of  intercultural cooperation in global 
communication.  
Keywords: Intercultural communication, religion and culture, 
youth culture, Korean wave, ethnography 
 
Introduction 
Hallyu (Korean wave) in Indonesia draws new attention when 
Korean media has faced challenges both culturally and politically as 
anti-Hallyu movements emerge in diverse parts of  Asia including Japan, 
Taiwan and China, and political disputes such as THAAD incident 
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between China and Korea give rise to conflicts between nations. 
Although Hallyu attracted large parts of  Asian audiences to Korean 
TV dramas in the early 2000s, the popularity of  Korean TV shows has 
started to decline within a decade. Korean cultural industry and public 
agents cooperate each other to set up a new strategy to revive Hallyu 
designating it Hallyu 2.0 in the late 2000s and now Hallyu 3.0 which 
aim for diversifying genre of  entertainments and expanding regional 
areas of  exporting Korean cultural products.1 K-pop and diverse 
entertainments are the focus of  the strategies and spreading Hallyu 
beyond East Asian countries is another point of  it. Southeast Asia is a 
new area of  interest in addition to Europe because the former has 
been always royal to Korean wave from the beginning until now. 
Particularly, Indonesia is considered as a new area of  interests for 
Hallyu 3.0 because Indonesia has the 4th largest population in the 
world as well as contains strong fandom of  Korean media. The 
questions, however, need to be explained on the pattern of  how strong 
K-pop fandom is maintained despite the huge cultural and religious 
differences between Indonesia and Korea, and how media users 
constitute their cultural identities by consuming popular culture.  
Intercultural communication between Islamic culture in Indonesia 
and seemingly the opposite such as Korean pop culture is the focus of  
the study. Islamic youth culture and their consumption of  popular 
culture will be examined in order to look into daily practice of  religion 
and cultural implication of  it by conducting an ethnographic study of  
Indonesian teenagers who are fans of  Korean media and Korean 
popular music (K pop).  
Indonesia has one of  the biggest K pop fandoms and the number 
is growing these days in spite of  large discrepancy between two 
cultures. Indonesia is the world largest Muslim country whereas K-pop 
is the advent of  commercialized cultural industry and Northern 
European version of  Korean popular music with little Asian identities 
in it as many critiques pointed out.2 Recently Music Bank, a TV 
program of  Korean public broadcasting KBS, held in Jakarta as a 
series of  world tours in two years, and 13,000 fans gathered all over 
                                                                
1 Sunny Yoon, “Taming the Primitive: Multiculturalism and the Anthropological 
Vision of  South Korean Media,” Visual Anthropology, 28, 5 (2015): pp. 422-437. 
2 U Siriyuvasak and H. Shin, “Asianizing K-pop,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies. 8, 1 (2007): 
pp. 99-136.  
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Indonesia.3 Most of  them were girls wearing hijabs but it is no barrier 
for the Muslim youngsters to cry out and dance with Korean idols. 
 
The contemporary popularity of  Korean media in Indonesia 
signifies many interesting points in intercultural or inter-religious 
communication. K pop is a specific version of  Korean pop music 
which is westernized and industry-oriented music targeted for a global 
audience. There is a huge cultural and value gap between Islamic 
beliefs and global contents of  K pop. Therefore, exactly how these 
values are reconciled with the fascination that many young Muslims 
have regarding the culture of  K pop is an intriguing topic for the study 
of  intercultural communication.  
In order to scrutinize cultural practice of  young Muslims who are 
strong believers in religion and at the same time passionate fans of  
Korean media and K pop, this study applied an ethnographic approach 
in Indonesia for 8 months in 2017. In-depth interviews and 
participatory observation for the field work of  this ethnography were 
conducted.  
 
A Historical Context of  Indonesian Islam 
Although Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country, it has a 
rather unique religious system different from the countries in the 
Middle East. First, Indonesia is not an Islamic State but allows 
freedom of  religion. This freedom is due to Pancasila which has five 
constitutional principles supporting diversity and freedom to choose 
religion but allowing no room for atheism.4 Every Indonesian has to 
choose a religion in their ID card. Since the beginning in the 13th 
century when Islam was integrated in Indonesia, Indonesian Islam has 
been complex and multicultural in character.5 This complexity has 
developed through colonial history and resistance against Western 
influence and authoritarian regimes in the 20th century. Under 
authoritarian regimes of  Sukarno and Suharto from the 40s and until 
the 90s, Islamic principles such as Jihad and Sharia are the fundamental 
                                                                
3 Mail Daily Sept. 4, 2017. 
4 Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of  Tolerance 
(London: Routledge, 1997). 
5 John L. Esposito, Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987); Clifford Geertz, The interpretation of  Cultures (New York: Basic 
Books, 1973). 
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roles in politics and social life of  the people.  
However, Indonesian Jihad is different from what is often 
presumed as holy war and related to terrorism. Indonesian Jihad is 
rather moderating and oriented toward soft power focusing on 
modernization projects and social development. Two major Islamic 
organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah, influence Indonesian people’s lives by managing 
schools, hospitals and social welfares as religious responsibility of  
Jihad.6 
Many scholars argue that Indonesian Islam has become radicalized 
these days since Suharto stepped-down. 7  Suharto who banned 
democratic movements, but at the same time promoted diversity. 
Suharto regime prohibited Islamic rituals like wearing veils in the 
public sphere including media in order to maintain diversity in the 
public life. The new order was established after Suharto’s resignation 
for the purpose of  promoting democratization. In this process, 
Indonesian Islam became more radicalized, ironically. After Suharto, 
more and more Islamic organizations became involved in politics by 
establishing political parties, and minor Islamic organization including 
radicals also participate in politics and social activities.   
Radicalization of  Islam not only affects public life but also 
influences everyday lives of  people in general. The most noticeable 
change of  radicalization in Indonesia in everyday practice can be 
wearing veils. Now most Indonesian women wear hijab and express 
their religious piety like Muslims in other countries. However, 
commonly wearing hijab is rather a new phenomenon in Indonesia 
dating back to the late 90s. Veiling has not been allowed in the public 
sphere including media until this century when the new order was 
established after Suharto. Now female models wear veils in TV 
commercials and others which were totally banned in the last century. 
Veiling became a new trend among Indonesian women mostly in this 
century.  
                                                                
6 M. C. Ricklefs, Islam in the Indonesian Social Context (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of  
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1991); Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The Political 
Behavior of  a Muslim Modernist Organization Under Dutch Colonialism (Yogyakarta, 
Indonesia: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989). 
7 A Alamsyah and Hadize, “Three Islamist generations, one Islamic State,” Critical 
Asian Studies, 49, 1 (2017): pp. 54-72; Taufiqur Rahman, “Contexualizing Jihad and 
mainstream Muslim identity in Indonesia,” Asian Journal of  Communication (forthcoming, 
2017); J. Azumah, Challenging Radical Islam (New York: Research Library, 2015). 
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In this way, wearing hijab and jilbab is not simply a religious rituals 
and radicalization of  religion, but also contains diverse meaning for 
people in general. For Indonesian women, hijab became a kind of  
trendy fashion and many researchers have warned of  the 
commodification of  Islam in this context. 8  Commodification of  
religion in the case of  veiling and other religious customs may not be 
limited to Indonesia but the same happens in the Middle East and 
African countries. However, the Indonesian case shows a radical 
change in a short period of  time because only a small number of  
women, usually feminist groups or intellectuals in universities, wore 
veils with specific intention for the purpose of  activism until the 90s. 
Now majority women wear veils and it has become a fashion in 
Indonesia. Wearing veils imply complex meaning for Indonesian 
women; radicalization of  Islam and resistance against Western 
influence, but at the same time capitalist commercialism and new life 
style prevailed by media are also involved in everyday practice of  this 
religious ritual.  
Since Stuart Hall initiated to see the diversity of  meaning in media, 
many media scholars have adopted ethnography to examine the 
decoding process of  media audience.9 This research is a part of  those 
efforts focusing on the complex process of  reading media by having 
an ethnographic study, although the scope of  the research expands to 
intercultural communication and to highlighting the cultural conflicts 
involved in religions. Changes and practices of  Islamic culture in 
Indonesia have complex meaning for the people, and ethnography of  
K-pop fandom in this study can explain such complexity and fluidity 
of  changes in real life.  
Indonesia is one of  the countries to draw ethnographers’ attention 
most since Geertz’s famous field study.10 Recently, more ethnographic 
studies tend toward on examining popular culture and Muslims. One 
focus of  study has been chic lit. Dewi examined this genre for young 
                                                                
8 Greg Fealy and Sally White, Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia 
(Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 2008); J. Marie Mushaben, “Gender, 
hiphop and pop-islam,” Citizenship studies, 12, 15 (2008): pp. 507-526. 
9 Stuart Hall, Culture, Media, Language (London: Routledge, 1980). See for instance L. 
Grossberg, “Another boring day in paradise: Rock ‘n roll and the empowerment of  
everyday life,” Popular Music, 4 (1984): pp. 225-258; S. Cohen, “Ethnography and 
Popular music studies,” Popular Music, 12, 2 (1993): pp. 123-138.   
10 Geertz, The interpretation of  Cultures. 
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Muslim women and formation of  identity for these readers.11 The best 
seller chic lit in Indonesia include Jilbab Bitney Spears, Funny Islamic 
boarding school girls. The titles of  the literatures illustrate irony of  Islamic 
culture in Indonesia and complexity of  hybriding religion and popular 
culture, commercialism and resistance in young Muslim’s subculture.  
Another area of  focus has been on popularity of  idol that is a new 
trend of  Indonesian culture.12 In Islamic states, any kind of  idols are 
prohibited including material and non-material idols such as idol 
singers and stars. The first order of  Jihad of  Islamic war is to destroy 
idols when they invade in other territories as we see destruction of  
world heritage by ISIS. Live idols are not the exception to this 
fundamental Islamic principle. However, recently Idol culture is 
spreading through media in Indonesia, and popularity of  K- pop Idols 
has been led such phenomena of  this new culture. Indonesia imported 
a format of  TV program from Korea, and make program titled 
Indonesian Idol and bench mark Korean and Taiwan idols. Examples of  
such idols are AFI, KDI who are very famous throughout Indonesia 
while K pop fans condemn them calling them copycat of  K pop idols.  
Indonesian pop music, Dangdut has also been studied using 
ethnography. Weintraub finds Indonesian identity of  the people at the 
bottom in Dangdut while mainstream media and popular culture are 
oriented toward upper middle class. 13  He sees lyrics of  Dangdut 
representing resistance and democratic aspiration particularly those 
made post Suharto era in late 90s. Thus, popular culture hinges upon 
religion, fame and ordinariness as shown in chic lit, Dangdut and Idol 
culture in media represent the efforts of  the people to find their 
cultural identity in everyday practice.  
This study is another ethnographic attempt to examine identity 
formation by the people in their everyday practices. Particularly, it 
focuses on reception of  K-pop by teenage Muslim in Indonesia who 
enjoy Korean popular culture despite the huge discrepancy from their 
religion and culture. This implies important cultural issues including 
not only industrial success and fad of  pop culture but also public 
                                                                
11 Novita Dewi, “Formation of  Youth Identity in Indonesian chick Lit,” K@ta, 13, 1 
(2011): pp. 134-146 
12  Penelope Coutas, “Fame, Fortune, Fantasi: Indonesian Idol and the New 
Celebrity,” Asian Journal of  Communication, 16, 4 (2006): pp. 371-392. 
13 A. Weintraub, “Dangdut Soul: Who are the people in Indonesian popular music,” 
Asian Journal of  Communication, 16, 4 (2006): pp. 411-431. 
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aspiration for social changes and resistance of  it, As veiling implies a 
diverse meaning such as radicalization of  Islam and resistance against 
westernization and globalization as well as efforts of  forming cultural 
identity, so may do new adolescent culture of  Indonesian Muslims 
affected by K pop and Korean media.  
 
K-pop Fandom in Indonesia 
This study conducted ethnographic field work in Indonesia for 
eight months in 2017. For three months, face to face interviews and 
participatory observation were conducted, and for next five months 
online interviews using SNS and emails were continued. The subjects 
of  this study were teenage Muslims in Indonesia and 25 people 
selected in one high school belong to Muhammadiyah and one K-pop 
fan club, the GOT7 fan club. The field study was conducted in 
Yogyakarta which is the center of  cultural and education city including 
diverse regional and ethnic backgrounds. Because many people come 
to this city to have a good education, there is an advantage to meet 
people in diverse backgrounds. All the participants voluntarily take part 
in this study recommended by the teachers in the school and organizer 
of  the fan club.  
I had both group interviews and individual interviews for all the 
participants. There was one time group interview at the high school 
and another one with the GOT7 fan club. A short survey for both 
groups was conducted at the beginning of  group interview. The group 
interview last for two hours. After the group interview, each participant 
scheduled for individual interviews for 3 times. Additionally, we had 
small group interview with 3-4 people for one time. Individual 
interviews and small group interview last for about an hour. An 
individual interview with about 10 people used , English which 
accompanied by translator for other 15 who speak Indonesian and for 
all the group interviews.  
 
Religious Piety and Reception of  K-pop among Young Muslims 
in Indonesia 
One of  the most striking facts that this research finds is the 
religious piety of  young people in Indonesia. In any nation, young 
people tend to leave from religious institutions as a symbol of  
counterculture. In Europe and America, youth congregation in 
churches declined drastically and there are few young people in East 
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Asian Buddhism. Korea is no exception where young congregation in 
churches is decreasing year by year, although Korea has one of  the 
strongest Christian populations in the world.14  
In contrast, 90% of  the Indonesian population is Islamic and so is 
the youth population. In this context, the popularity of  K-pop among 
young people in Indonesia is rather surprising because K-pop shows 
western, capitalist commercial values in music and performance to 
such an extent that some even argue that K-pop is not Korean music.15 
Therefore, K-pop obviously represents quite different values from 
Islam. Some may see the reason why K-pop is popular in Indonesia 
because young Indonesians are not very religious but affiliated with it 
due to family and peer pressure. 16  However, in the interview, 
researcher found that young people are strong in faith and serious with 
religious activities.  
For example, among interview subjects, all wear hijab or jilbab 
except two girls and all the students obey Islamic rules. It was striking 
to know that all these high teens get up 4, 5 in the morning and cleanse 
themselves for prayer. All the 25 participants say sholat, the five times 
pray a day, is the most important thing in their lives including those 
who do not wear a veil. Even the boys with rebellious attitudes during 
the interview agreed with this. Considering daily life-style of  young 
people who use SNS and internet until late at night and particularly 
those who indulge in K-pop and listening and watching K-pop and 
media for over 10 hours a day, it is surprising to hear that these young 
people still get up at 5 am and pray with family every day. All of  them 
obey Ramadhan and some of  them have extra fasting on a weekly basis. 
Half  of  the students spend extra time for additional pray and study 
Quran and sing Islamic hymn every day in addition to normal sholat 
(prayer). 
 
                                                                
14 Sunny Yoon, “Tuning in Sacred: Youth Culture and Contemporary Christian 
Music,” International Review of  the Aesthetics and Sociology of  Music, 47, 2 (2016): pp. 315-
342. 
15  Ubonrat Siriyuvasak and Shin Hyunjoon, “Asianizing K-pop: production, 
consumption and identification patterns among Thai youth,” Inter-Asia Cultural 
Studies, 8, 1 (2007): pp. 109-136. 
16 D. French, et al., “Friendship and the religiocity of  Indonesian Muslim,” Journal of  
Youth Adolescence, 40 (2011): pp. 1623-1633 
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In the interview17 three girls confessed that they sometimes skip 
pray and only do 2-3 times. But even them, they feel guilty about it and 
consider sholat to be important like the others. 
“When I forgot about pray, I feel troubled and very heavy at 
heart. I want to be better, but hard to follow it all the time,” said 
8.  
8 confessed heavy guilty with religious duty. As for 11 who grew 
up in more liberal family background and were fond of  Western 
culture, religious belief  seems the same. Her father was educated in 
Australia. Even though she is more liberal than other students, she still 
feels guilty for not being religious and duty for Islamic Jihad. Also 
there are pressures on her from others.  
“I am not very religious and lazy. Others say to me that I end up 
going to hell… ha ha. But I am lazy and tired. I frequently forgot 
about time to pray and do it 3-4 times a day… Religion gives me 
inspiration. I should be changed, pray hard and become a better 
person,” 11 stated. 
In contrast, one of  Got 7 fan club member, G4 shows high 
religious piety in her life experience. Her case is not exceptional, 
however, but rather average experience for Indonesian Muslim these 
days. In interviews, students state the most frequent lesson they hear 
from parents and teacher was “don’t forget pray time”, and the second 
most was “study hard”. Islamic rule is the number one priority for 
Indonesian young people. Religious orientation of  young Muslim 
shows social values in Indonesia. 
“I am religious. I started to reading Quran since 4 years old and 
wear hijab since 5 when I was kindergarten. Some did not wear 
hijab nor pray on time. But praying is the duty of all,” G4 told. 
In this environment, some Muslim women who are not wearing 
veils still show strong religious faith for example, G2 and G6.  
G2: “I sometimes wear veil, but not usually. I am not sufficient in 
religion. Wearing veil means a promise to God like a monk. I only 
pray five times without reading Quran every day. Wearing hijab 
                                                                
17 The reseacher promised the interview subjects not to disclose their names, thus 
identify 18 students at Muhammadiyah II high school by calling from 1 to 18. For 7 
students who are members of  GOT 7 fan club, I count them from G 1 to G 7 in the 
citation.  
  
Sunny Yoon 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 13, Number 01, June 2019 
10 
means putting a wall and having no relation until marriage when I 
meet a boy. That is too much burden for me… I don’t have 
pressure on wearing veil from mom or anyone else,” G2 stated 
clearly. 
Similarly, G6 said that “Mom told me that I should be good when 
I wear veil. I am not good enough. I only pray 5 times, read Quran and 
pray for ancestors. Sometimes I forget because I am still a high teen”. 
As the interviewees stated religious piety of  Indonesian Muslims 
may sound too strong for foreign standard, but there are complex 
factors involved in religious belief. As discussed earlier, wearing a veil 
in the Indonesian context has not been only religious but also has 
cultural meaning. As society is modernized and liberalized, ironically, 
more and more women wear veils and the number is increasing now in 
Indonesia. They consider it as part of  the activity of  conserving 
cultural identity from global influence. Moreover, veiling became a 
trendy fashion for Muslim women. One of  interviewee agreed that 
veiling is part of  her fashion and mentioned wearing a veil was 
considered as “Arabian” and stiff  in the prior generation of  hers. It is a 
matter of  interpretation on how to view religious piety and growing 
number of  wearing a veil. It may mean radicalization of  Islam in 
Indonesia, or liberalization of  politics and religion, or both. The fact is 
that contradicting phenomena happen simultaneously in Indonesia.  
In the same manner, popularity of  Korean popular culture in 
Indonesia, particularly among young Muslims signifies multiple 
meaning. In the field research, the first reaction of  interview 
participants was that there are few cultural similarities between 
Indonesia and Korea. They also confess that viewing Korean drama 
and K-pop performance is not a desirable thing to do from the Islamic 
perspective.  
“I think there is only difference in culture between Indonesia and 
Korea... but I have never seen Korean stuff from religious 
perspective” 1 said. 
As these students stated they found a big cultural difference 
between the two countries, yet accept these differences excusing that 
those are only entertainment and belong to other cultures. According 
to interviewees, clothing is the most different thing between the two 
countries. Since it is prohibited to show any part of  the body for 
Muslim women, shorts and tank top that K pop idols are wearing can 
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make them embarrassed. Nevertheless, they accept the difference and 
enjoy it because it is for entertainment.  
“I think there are huge difference in culture between Indonesia 
and Korea but it’s OK to watch exposing body and skinship 
because of different culture. Anyway it’s for entertainment,” 12 
confessed.  
“I think it’s OK to watch Korean things we should respect other 
cultures. I feel encouraged and good when I listen K pop,” 8 told 
to interviewer. 
However, they show contradicting opinion on Western popular 
culture. Most of  the participants, with the exception of  three boys, do 
not care for American or European pop music by saying they look too 
vulgar. They criticized that Western pop singers express overly sexual 
and violent. These students also criticized Indonesian rock stars 
because they imitate Western singers. It sounds contradictory to accept 
Korean popular culture despite the cultural difference while declining 
Western culture because of  it. Considering the fact that K-pop is 
Westernized version of  Korean pop music that many Western 
musicians are involved in making music and choreography, and K-pop 
agencies follow the rules of  American pop music, contradictory 
reactions of  Indonesian adolescents to K-pop and Western music are 
more perplexing. This can be explained through a deeper 
understanding of  the adolescent culture of  Indonesians by using this 
ethnographic study. 
 
Emotional Devotion and Social Consciousness 
The first reason why Indonesian young people like K-pop idols 
and Korean actors was because Korean idols are handsome and pretty 
according to their interview statements. All the girls were fascinated by 
handsome Korean boy bands. Even girls in Islamic Boarding Schools 
those who were interviewed for post study react very girlishly when 
they described their favorite singers. These girls stated the same that 
they like those idols because they are handsome. This may sound 
superficial and immature to be attracted only by appearance, but I 
found a deeper meaning while having numerous meetings and 
conversation with them. First when they were asked what handsome 
means for them, they replied sharp nose, pale skin and red lips. They 
automatically compared Korean idols with Indonesian typical men 
with round nose, dark skin, and dark red lips.  
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“because they (Korean idols) are handsome. White skin, sharp 
nose and tidy. Indonesian boys do a lot of outdoor activities and 
have brown skin. They don’t care themselves and lazy. Most are 
lazy,” II said. 
 
Similarly, 6 told “I like Exo. Their noses are different from 
Indonesian men and lips too. Exo have pink lips and sparking eyes... ha 
ha…,”. 
Their statements may sound almost racial stereotype, but it would 
be a hasty conclusion to call them racists. As mentioned earlier, these 
girls are not fond of  white people who have more sharp nose and 
white skin. These girls dislike Western style which they see as vulgar. 
Even those who like American pop, did not like appearance of  
American singers. 
6 told that “I don’t like American they look vulgar. Their piercings 
are so big and makeup is so strong”. 
American singers try to look cool and macho,” 12 said. 
G6 stated “Korean singers are cute and sexy, but Americans hot 
sexy. I see they are vulgar”. 
As they stated, they are not stereotyped by racism, even though 
they prefer pale skin and sharp nose of  Korean idols to Indonesian 
men. They mean more than appearance when they make evaluation of  
singers. Whenever they mentioned appearance of  Korean idols, they 
always talk about personality and attitude.  
12 “Korean men are kind. I found they are perfectionist when I 
watch drama and variety shows on TV. Even ordinary students 
(on TV drama) work hard for good grade and always do 
something which is different from Indonesian students”. 
15 “I like their spirits. I am fan of BTS. They belong to small 
agency but work hard and accomplish success. Once I was 
injured, and was challenged by watching BTS, I took exam 
because I was encouraged by BTS’s efforts”. 
1 “Korean idols are so energetic. They prepare everything perfect. 
That’s why they are loved by international fans”. 
As the interview participants stated, they are fascinated by the 
personality and attitude of  Korean idols not just appearance. They 
fascinated by Korean idols as ideal men not simply because of  
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handsome appearance but because of  their own images of  an ideal 
man. They often compare Korean singers with Indonesian singers who 
are not properly trained and become a star out of  luck according to 
these interviewees’ evaluation. From the perspective of  Koreans or 
Western people, perfectionism may mean negative psychology, but 
Indonesian girls admire perfectionists and see them as ideal. They even 
envy the stressful life of  Korean high school students who have a 
heavy burden of  study and pressure from Korean parents. Koreans 
usually say “hell of  high school days” due to this pressure but 
Indonesian youngsters envy these struggles and they would like to try 
the same.  
Cultural preference of  Indonesian youngsters contains social 
consciousness of  their circumstances. In both group and individual 
interviews, all the participants except 3 boys point out the 
contemporary problem with Indonesian adolescents are related to 
violence. These girls complain about gangsters at school and violent 
bullying.  
13 stated that “violence at school is the most serious problem. 
Some boys bring weapons to school and fight”. 
11 had similar opinion about the violence often occur in the school, 
“Boys in Islamic school fight over boys in another religious school. 
Last year, one person was killed in the fight”. 
“Gangsters are problem. In Korea, everyone is busy with 
studying,” 6 said. 
These young girls feel insecure because of  violent environments 
even in schools. Ideal images of  men and admire of  Kpop idols are 
related to the condition of  young Indonesians that they have to face in 
their everyday lives. As Hermes argues, identity formation in the 
audience’s media consumption “is sociological rather than 
psychological process”.18 K-pop fandom among Indonesian young 
people illustrate the social consciousness of  the audience beyond 
individual cultural taste and passive consumption of  entertainment. In 
light of  series of  British cultural studies and Bourdieu’s field theory 
that show implication of  pressure on social stagnation and changes out 
of  mass consumption of  culture and media, K-pop fandom also 
signify competition between two types of  power; hegemony and 
                                                                
18 Joke Hermes, “Media figures in identity construction,” Pertti Alasuutari (ed.), 
Rethinking the Media Audience (London: Sage 1999), p. 71. 
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resistance. These two kinds of  power illustrate how James Bond 
becomes a popular hero19 on one hand, and Punk20 and Hip pop21 
become models for consolidating subculture on the other hand. The 
consumption of  popular culture is the process of  constructing Habitus 
according to Bourdieu that facilitates social controls in one way or 
another. Fascination with K-pop and Korean idols among Indonesians 
represents social consciousness of  fandom. These young people reside 
in a society where they feel insecure and no hope for the future. Their 
fascination with Korean pop culture illustrates their ideal and 
aspiration.  
 
Emulation of  culture and motivations of  building a community 
All the participants in this study state that there is no similarity 
between Korean and Indonesian culture. They point out that religious 
difference represented in fashion and love relations. Nonetheless, they 
imitate Korean pop culture in their everyday lives underneath. 
“I imitate a lot Korean idols; hair styles, fashion and makeup. I set 
my hair with iron like Korean female idol and wear Hijab so that 
no one can see my hair. I bought Korean lip tint and wear it deep 
side of my lips. I also wear hot shorts in my room. Those are not 
allowed in the public space, but I do it in private for myself,” 12 
told to interviewer. 
“I listen K pop all the time. I learn drum and guitar and play by 
myself in my room,” G3 stated. 
It is prohibited to imitate Korean appearance and performance 
from Islamic standard, but they use veil and private way to emulate 
Korean culture and Korean style. They create their own private space 
to resist social norms and religious rules. It may look mismatched for 
young girls to play drum heavily while wearing hijab, and to have 
fabulous hairstyle and shorts under jilbab. However, Indonesian young 
people emulate Korean customs and cultures in their lives. The 
imitation of  Korean culture illustrates the aspirations and social 
motivations of  Indonesian adolescents.  
 
                                                                
19 T. Bennett and Woollacott, Bond and Beyond: the Political Career of  a Popular Hero (New 
York: Macmillan, 1987). 
20 Dick Hebdige, Hiding in the light (London: Comedia, 1988). 
21 L. Grossberg, Dancing in spite of  myself (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997). 
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In interviews, the most frequently stated words were street and 
garbage next to comments on their favourite singers. It may sound odd 
that high school students mentioned garbage and street so much and 
make wonder why these words are important to them. The 
ethnographic study put a lot of  time to understand the inner meaning 
of  words in the fieldwork. As a matter of  fact, that is the most time 
consuming work to do and why ethnographers spend years in the field. 
Conveying indigenous term needs time and listening skills as well as 
self-reflection in order not to impose exogenous meaning.22 Clifford 
Geertz’s ethnographic masterpiece on Bali represents how Balinese 
way of  naming a person, calculating time, and practicing rituals are 
different from the European one.23 Robert Levy’s study of  Tahitians 
shows a distinctive way of  using the indigenous term and forming a 
sense of  personhood and self  in light of  ethnographic representation 
of  the indigenous culture.24 In this regard, Indonesian adolescents 
should have inner meaning when they speak about garbage and street 
though they may sound strange at first.  
“I like walking culture in Korea. Streets are clean and safe. 
Garbage in garbage can. You can walk anywhere in Korea. Here I 
cannot walk in the street. Very scary,” 15 said. 
Clean street in Seoul seems a symbol of  advancement and a new 
vision for the future to these youngsters. the researcher can concur 
with their feeling of  using the words, street and garbage even though 
my experience is limited having three months stay in a city of  
Indonesia. If  self-reflection of  indigenous words is allowed for this 
ethnographer, the interviewer would say that their words are related to 
their despair and wish for outlets. In the course of  interviews, they 
often express their disappointment with the social system and say 
“there is no hope for the future in Indonesia”. They aspire to go to 
Korea and live there believing it’s another world from Indonesian 
reality as shown in drama and music video. This may sound a fantasy 
manipulated by media, but implies social consciousness of  the young 
                                                                
22 R. Emerson, et. al., Writing Ethnographic Field notes (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1995). 
23 Geertz, The interpretation of  Cultures. 
24 Robert Levy, Tahitians: Mind and experience in the society islands (Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 1973). 
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audience, criticism and drive for finding an alternative while being 
entertained by the media. 
 
Conclusion 
One of  the hottest debates in religious communication occurs 
from two competing views; one puts an emphasis on religion as 
doctrine and the other on religion as practice. It looks as though power 
of  religion declines in the 21st century as we observe the declining 
number of  churchgoers in the world. However, if  one considers 
religion as a practice, it is not clear that the influence of  religion has 
been weakened in the contemporary world. Davie surveyed in 
Northern Europe countries and found that 70% of  population still 
practices Christianity despite churchgoers being only 2.6%.25 This 
means that many people leave the church as a religious institution and 
doctrines, they still practice religious belief  by using media mostly and 
other means of  religious experiences. In this regard, many scholars in 
religious communication focus on mediatization in order to examine 
the practice of  religion by people, in general, these days.26 
In the Islamic world, however, religion has always accompanied 
practice. Unlike Western society that has accomplished separation 
between sacred and secular in history, Islam has never separated 
religious doctrine from religious practice, and religion is involved in 
everyday life of  the people. This can cause problems and conflicts as 
we observed conflicts such as one from terror to debate on “burkini” 
in Europe for example. 
However, religion as a practice may allow room for tolerance and 
cooperation by permitting intrinsic ways of  individual faith and 
practising religion. Many Indonesian youngsters are faithful Muslims 
but at the same time passionate fans of  K-pop. This ethnographic 
study found neither one of  the two is hypocrisy or cover-up. Young 
Indonesians are both faithful obeys of  religion and simultaneously 
zealous lovers of  K pop. Considering the fact that even in Korea, K 
                                                                
25 G. Davie, Religion in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
26 N. Couldry, “Mediatization or mediation,” New Media society, 10, 3 (2008): pp. 373-
391; S. Hjarvard, “The mediatisation of  religion: theorizing religion, media and social 
change,” Culture and Religion, 12, 2 (2011): pp. 119-135; G. Lynch, “What can we learn 
from the mediatization of  religion debate?,” Culture and Religion, 12 2 (2011): pp. 203-
210; J. Stro ̈mback, “Mediatization and perception of  media’s political influence,” 
Journalism Studies, 12, 14 (2011): p. 423-439. 
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pop has disregarded once as a target of  cultural imperialism having no 
Asian/Korean cultural identity in music, and being notorious for 
exploitative contracts between artists and agencies, and of  exploitation 
of  women and minorities in ages, it may look mismatched that faithful 
Muslim fascinated by K pop. From the point of  view of  Islamic values, 
K pop can be seen as a spreader of  Western imperialism and capitalist 
decay. 
On the contrary, young Indonesians use K pop in practice as a 
strategy for stimulating new vision for the future. Korean idols are 
model for them to have energy and diligence and to surmount 
despairing reality that they are facing in everyday life. More importantly, 
they coopted Islam and K pop together to attempt to emancipate them 
and lead to better life. Religion is not a barrier to this way for them. 
They wear hijab while emulating Korean pop culture but not to evade 
from social norms and religious doctrine. Wearing hijab contains 
multiple meanings for Indonesian women: not only expression of  
religious piety but also cultural identity as well as fashionable 
commercialism and social networking, which has not been spread until 
the 21st century widely. In the same token, Hijab is not barrier to enjoy 
popular culture at individuals’ choice, in this case study K pop, but a 
flexible means to emulate their ideals and their favorite idols.  
There is no doubt that radicalized Islam threatens much of  the 
world these days. Indonesia is no exception to this trend, particularly 
after Suharto when liberalization and radicalization goes by together 
since the end of  90s. Yet, there is complexity happening in the trend 
of  radicalization that cannot be diminished to religious doctrine or 
terrorism. In practice, religious faith and cultural entertainment may 
not be contradicting each other as it first seemed. Young Muslims in 
Indonesia who enjoy K pop are not contradicting themselves if  one 
listen struggles in their lives and motivations for their life. Therefore, 
this ethnographic study illustrates a possible case of  good intercultural 
communication and a model for flexible cultural and religious 
integration in global community.[] 
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